on top of it, it became increasingly clear that the opposition to assad is very mixed. some of it involves some of our friends who are sponsoring salafi movements. some of it involves infiltration of al-qaeda types into syria. some of it involves iranian involvement, and, therefore, the picture is far from clear. it was also increasingly effort that we didn't really have strong support from groups that were capable of organizing an effective military resistance. so we have been stalemated. recently, we have announced that we'll provide money to the resistance groups and humanitarian aid, but we'll not give them arms. well, which is a curious decision because, first of all, we don't really know to whom to give arms in the first place. so we're not going the give arms, because we don't know who the recipients are, how reliable they are. but we're going to give some people some money and humanitarian aid. since humanitarian aid, in particular money, is fungible, they can buy arms. so whom are we really arming indirectly having decided in the first place that there aren't a